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Sex scandals in politics lead to intense public debates about funda-
mental issues, such as morality, publicity, and privacy, rendering
gender inequalities more visible than ever. This article aims to
reveal the complex gendered dynamics of the political culture
by looking at sex scandals in contemporary Turkey. The ways
in which these scandals have been narrated, negotiated, and
resolved among the public and political actors provide grounds
for analysis about the nature of patriarchal dynamics regard-
ing women’s agency and public credibility communicated through
their sexuality in contemporary Turkey.
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INTRODUCTION
The public sphere in Turkey, despite its rhetoric of equal access to all, rests
on multiple exclusions including gender (Fraser 1990, 1992). Women’s sex-
uality and autonomy are cast as an oxymoron in this exclusionary sphere.
Women can participate in the public sphere as professionals and politicians,
but they are still expected to remain submissive when it comes to the issue
of autonomy and veil their sexuality.
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Gender in Political Sex Scandals in Turkey 465
Extraordinary moments in political life, in which sex scandals suddenly
erupt, lead to intense public debates about fundamental issues such as moral-
ity, publicity, and privacy. These moments render the structures of gender
inequality more visible than ever because they reveal whose narrations are
counted in the formation of public opinion. The Baykal/Baytok political sex
scandal in 2010 could be considered such an exemplary moment in contem-
porary political life in Turkey because of its massive impact on the social
and political debates that lasted over an extensive period of time following
the scandal. This article aims to reveal the complex gendered dynamics of
the political culture and the politics of public credibility in contemporary
Turkey by analyzing this scandal of the former Republican People’s Party
(RPP) leader Deniz Baykal that resulted in his resignation from the party
leadership in May 2010. The ways in which this scandal has been (1) nar-
rated, (2) negotiated, and (3) resolved among the public and political actors
provide us with clues about the nature of the patriarchal dynamics regard-
ing women’s agency, sexuality, and political participation in contemporary
Turkey. Therefore, the article disentangles the gender asymmetries concern-
ing privacy and publicity in the political realm, which have been revealed
with the emergence of this political sex scandal that exposed the intricacies
of the patriarchal political culture in Turkey.
A brief summary of the scandal is as follows: On midnight of May
7, 2010, a nine-minute video clip that purportedly depicted the former
Republican People’s Party (RPP) leader Mr. Deniz Baykal engaging in inti-
mate moments with another RPP parliamentarian, Ms. Nesrin Baytok, in
a bedroom, appeared on the Internet news sites. This incident led to a
period of intense public debate and political turmoil among different politi-
cal actors in Turkey. The Justice and Development Party (JDP) leader, Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who represents conservative and moderate
Islamic right wing politics (Heper and Toktaş 2003) and who has been in
power since 2002, initially tried to ignore and censor the clip. However,
because of modern Web technology, the clip immediately became accessi-
ble to the public through various Web sites, including YouTube, and the
ban did not work as intended.1 In short, the Baykal/Baytok scandal, similar
to the Clinton/Lewinsky scandal, unfolded in an era of new media politics
that presented unforeseen challenges to Mr. Baykal’s political leadership.2
As a result, probably for the first time in Turkish politics, due to the capac-
ity for widespread and unfettered dissemination of content with new media
technology, a sex scandal could not be avoided.3
The RPP members at first interpreted the event as a conspiratorial
attempt by the JDP to make Mr. Baykal look bad in the media, forcing
him to step down from the leadership and jeopardizing the credibility of
the RPP in the public’s eyes. However, when the spread of the video footage
could not be controlled and public widely accessed the footage, it was no






























466 D. Cindoglu and D. Unal
reputation was considerably damaged and his resignation became inevitable.
Although in the beginning he was expected to run again for the leadership
elections on May 22, 2010, he did not offer his candidacy. The only candi-
date who applied was Mr. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu who succeeded unanimously
and became the next president of the RPP after 18 years of Mr. Baykal’s
unchallenged power in the party.
By way of contrast, a similar political sex scandal broke out in Turkey
just before the 2011 general elections, but these tapes were significantly dif-
ferent in nature than those in the Baykal/Baytok scandal and they were
treated differently. They were also released on the Internet; however, the
tapes showed male members of parliament (MPs) from the Nationalist Action
Party (NAP) in casual intimate relationships with different women. Women’s
identities in those tapes were never revealed, and the public debate did not
consider the identity of these women worth exploring. These tapes not only
depicted the extramarital and intimate relationships of these politicians but
also included demeaning and offensive conversations regarding their con-
stituencies and displayed close sexual encounters in a group environment.
The expulsion of these male politicians from further political staff participa-
tion within the NAP may be attributed to the fact that they had transgressed
moral norms on several levels other than sexual misconduct.
However, in this article we are not dealing with the political sex scan-
dals regarding the NAP because women’s roles in those tapes were critically
different. Public debates did not dwell on the women who were involved in
this sex scandal at all, which is very likely due to the fact that the women
did not possess political or professional identities. Therefore, in this article
we argue that Ms. Baytok’s situation is unique within the context of the
recent political sex scandals in Turkey and requires further analysis. Unlike
the women involved in the political sex scandal that erupted in the NAP,
Ms. Baytok had been an influential political figure in the RPP inner circles
and became an MP in 2007, which made her involvement in a scandal more
controversial in the public debates.
The Baykal/Baytok sex scandal has been quite revealing in pointing
out the gendered asymmetries characterizing the public sphere in Turkey.
The public debates throughout the negotiation of the scandal were primar-
ily loaded with discourses condemning the extramarital affair of the actors
involved, investigating whether the videotape was a conspiracy, and empha-
sizing the protection of individuals’ rights to privacy.4 Those who were
critical of the use of the private lives of politicians for political gain only
pointed out the illegality and immorality of recording and releasing such a
videotape. Nevertheless, they missed the point that the whole evaluation of
the event was extremely gendered. Ms. Baytok and Mr. Baykal were posi-
tioned unequally with respect to privacy and publicity. While Mr. Baykal did
rightfully claim his privacy and contested the video images, Ms. Baytok, con-






























Gender in Political Sex Scandals in Turkey 467
the involvement of Ms. Baytok, a married woman politician, in the scandal
gave rise to a high degree of traumatic ripple effects on the public. Although
having an extramarital affair is not acceptable for either gender, it leads to
much more severe consequences for women in contemporary society in
Turkey. Thus, Ms. Baytok, as a married woman politician, who “violated”
the sexual norms of society by engaging in an alleged extramarital affair,
became unqualified for politics in the public imagination, severely damaging
her public credibility and causing her persona to be obliterated from the
public.
Drawing on these public debates, this article attempts to unravel the
gendered inequalities concerning publicity and privacy in Turkey. We will
mainly investigate how patriarchal structures in the public sphere in Turkey
give male actors in political life more power than women to draw the line
between their public and private lives. To do this, we will focus on the ways
in which this scandal has been (1) narrated, (2) negotiated, and (3) resolved
among the public and political actors in different ideological positions.
PUBLIC CREDIBILITY, GENDER, AND PUBLIC SPHERE
The concept of “public credibility” could be useful to analyze the gendered
character of the Baykal/Baytok political sex scandal. Public credibility con-
notes a realm of symbolic reference and defines the limits of what is publicly
relevant, reasonable, and respectable (Ku 2000, 229). The symbolic public
lays out the field of values, codes, representations, and discourses that actors
can draw on to establish their public credibility (Ku 2000). Accordingly,
actors shape their conduct in line with the moral and discursive boundary of
publicity. In this article we argue that the workings of the concept of pub-
lic credibility are extremely gendered. We investigate what happens to the
public credibility of a woman politician when she surpasses the moral norms
of society by displaying an autonomous sexual identity. Situating her posi-
tion vis-à-vis the male politician, we study the public discourses applying to
the public credibility of both parties. Our main focus here is on the working
mechanism of the symbolic realm of values, codes, and discourses regarding
public credibility and how it differs depending on the gender of the politi-
cians. Dominant values and codes that have been historically predefined by
both the state and society shape the processes of building and maintaining
of public credibility, which in return result in a number of exclusions in the
public sphere. In other words, building and maintaining of public credibility
is closely related to the exclusionary nature of the public sphere. Gender
is a main axis of exclusion; therefore, it permits us to observe the power
asymmetries involved in the functioning of public credibility.
In the last decades feminist critique has posed significant challenges






























468 D. Cindoglu and D. Unal
public sphere is a nonexclusive realm where private individuals gather to
debate issues of common concern. In this understanding, the public sphere
connotes an ideal of unrestricted rational discussion of public matters, which
is open and accessible to all. Feminist scholars, alternatively, contend that
Habermas’ account idealizes the public sphere. They argue that despite the
rhetoric of publicity and accessibility, the official public sphere rests on a
number of significant exclusions, including gender (Cohen 1995; Fraser 1990,
1992; Landes 1988). Assuming that the public sphere is the space where
emancipation and democratic liberties are realized, Habermas’ account does
not take into account the ways in which the public sphere can produce
power relations that work against the equal participation of actors. The
Habermasian account of the disinterested, rational debate in the public
sphere, which is based on openness and inclusivity, turns out to be idealistic
especially when it comes to the issues regarding moral values and discourses
over the same by the public. Far from being disinterested subjects, actors in
the public sphere, in general, are inclined toward improving their public
credibility by remaining within the moral and discursive boundary of public
life (Ku 2000). Yet if they fail to conform to the moral and discursive bound-
ary of publicity, their access to the tools to restore their shattered credibility
differs, depending on their gender. Thus, one may argue that the politics of
public credibility is ignored by the Habermasian conception due to the argu-
ment about inclusivity and openness and the stress on disinterested, rational
dialogue. Relying on the feminist critique of the Habermasian conception
of the public sphere, this article reflects on the politics of public credibil-
ity during the negotiation of a political sex scandal in public discourse in
Turkey.
In Turkey the crystallization of the gendered character of the public
sphere could be observed most clearly in the hegemonic codes, discourses,
and values of the public defined through gender identities. In this sense,
women’s visibility plays a decisive role in the definition of the bound-
aries of the public sphere in modern Turkey. Since the foundation of the
Republic in 1923, the public sphere in Turkey has not been imagined as
“a coming-together of critical-rational individuals that form organizations
and then confront, resist and challenge the state, but rather as a domain
whose contours are drawn and redrawn by the state” (Cindoğlu and Zencirci
2008, 794). Deeds, speech acts, and physical appearances of subjects in pub-
lic have been highly controlled through construction of gender identities
(Çınar 2005, 2008; Kadıoğlu 1994; Kandiyoti 1997). In this regard, there are
mainly two dominant political projects regarding gender identities in Turkey:
Kemalist and Islamist worldviews.5 Göle (1997) elaborates on this divergence
by suggesting that two particular moments in Turkish history were especially
important to detect the interlocking of gender, politics, and public sphere,
and these were the secularist project of modernization in the 1920s and






























Gender in Political Sex Scandals in Turkey 469
project regarded women’s presence in the public sphere as the marker of
the nation’s belonging to Western civilization. Thus, women’s visibility was
encouraged through celebrating women’s modern appearance and public
roles (Çinar 2005). In a similar way, the Islamist movement in Turkey, which
became quite strong in the post-1980s, attributed a symbolic meaning to the
presence of the veiled women in the public sphere, which in turn made
the “headscarf dispute” in Turkey more visible by protesting against the
ban prohibiting their entrance into public schools with headscarves (Arat
2005). Relying on these two historical moments, Göle (1997) puts forward
that regardless of the ideological positions of the political actors, women’s
corporeality in the public sphere appears as a discursive field in modern
Turkey, in which the boundaries of the public sphere are negotiated.
Women’s corporeal visibility and the attempts to regulate and use it are
at stake in the struggle over the definition of the public sphere, at the same
time the pervasive control over women’s sexuality constitutes a pivotal pillar
of the gendered discourse on the public sphere in Turkey (Kadıoğlu 1991).
Both modern and Islamist images of women are blended with values of
modesty; the former is said to be “modern but modest,” whereas the latter is
built on the motto “Muslim thus modest” (Najmabadi 1991). From here, it is
clear that no matter how divergent the political ideologies are, for the chief
political actors in modern Turkey women’s presence in the public sphere
operates along with meticulous surveillance of women’s sexualities.
NARRATION OF THE STORY
Mr. Baykal’s Version of the Story
After the story of the scandal broke, Mr. Baykal (born in 1938) did not
openly deny his possible sexual involvement with Nesrin Baytok or with
any other women in his postscandal political speeches. Rather, his speeches
were geared toward arguing that this was a plot made up by the government
party to discredit him as the RPP leader. Moreover, he consistently avoided
taking the matter personally and interpreted it as a general attack on the
RPP. He also stressed that his resignation should never be regarded as an act
of surrender; rather, in his view it was a sign of obvious resistance to the
conspirators. His speeches displayed self-confidence and did not carry any
expressions that could be interpreted as victim-like in any sense. The speech
that he made on May 10, 2010, in a press conference two days after the
outbreak of the scandal to announce his resignation from the RPP leadership
clearly reflects this self-confident tone and thus is worth quoting at length:
I am announcing my opinion and my decision that has been expected
for days. This is not simply a video clip, it is a plot. Such frame ups are






























470 D. Cindoglu and D. Unal
you violate the principle of privacy. With hidden camera shots you cut
and paste people’s most vulnerable pictures, assemble and distort them.
In this way you violate the sense of morals that is common to all religions
and all people around the world. They do not care about human dignity
and honor. Those who made up this plot did not do it because they
are perverts or with the aim to blackmail. They did it to achieve some
political goals.
This plot is manufactured. It is still very new, two weeks old. This plot
does not aim at one particular individual. Its target is RPP’s struggle to
fight against the civil dictatorship in the country . . . It is not possible to
arrange such a plot without getting the support of the ruling party . . .
The goodwill expressed in the aftermath of the conspiracy is not enough
to obscure the guilt of the framers of the plot. Those who condemn are
themselves the ones to be condemned.
I have something to deliver to those who say “what a shame!” You can-
not defend immoral and illegal conspiracies by believing in them. Those
who say “what a shame” make such conspiracies possible . . . I will not
surrender vis-à-vis this situation. If this requires paying a price and this
price is to resign from the RPP presidency, I will pay for it. My resigna-
tion does not mean that I am running away. On the contrary, it means
confrontation. With this understanding I am resigning from the RPP lead-
ership: the target here is not me, but the RPP. (“Deniz Baykal İstifa Etti”
[Deniz Baykal Resigned] 2010)
As an attempt to restore his credibility in the eyes of the public and his
constituency, Mr. Baykal’s lawyer hired a private investigation agency on the
May 11, 2010, one day after his resignation. The report by that agency was
released to the media on May 21, and it stated that the man in the video-
clip was not Deniz Baykal and the woman was not Nesrin Baytok (“Ulusal
Kriminal: Görüntülerdeki Baykal ve Baytok Değil” [National Criminal: Those
in the Video Are not Baykal and Baytok] 2010). However, Mr. Baykal strictly
refrained from making any declaration about his alleged affair with Ms.
Baytok. Rather, his strategy was to guard the boundary of his privacy and to
choose to deal with the scandal solely in terms of its public dimension (i.e.,
as an attack to the RPP). Thus, one might say that although his popularity in
the public’s mind was seriously shattered as a result of this sex scandal, Mr.
Baykal did succeed in claiming his rights to privacy.
The support from the RPP ranks and also from the supporters of
RPP for the continuation of Mr. Baykal’s power proved crucial to cooling
down the shocking effect of the scandal. RPP members convened in front
of Mr. Baykal’s house and shouted slogans asking Mr. Baykal not to leave
the party (“CHP’den Baykal’a ‘Geri Dön’ Mitingi” [RPP Organized a ‘Come-
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event, Mr. Baykal received many visits from RPP members (i.e., MPs, mayors,
and provincial chairmen), who unanimously declared their support for him.
Backed up by various political actors, in his public declarations Mr. Baykal
was able to talk about his political career in a self-reliant manner and to
state that he would keep on being active in politics as a parliamentarian, if
not as a party leader. In contrast, however, there was no considerable public
support of this sort for Ms. Baytok.
Ms. Baytok’s Version of the Story
Nesrin Baytok (born in 1960), an engineer, had been working for the RPP
since 1992 as an executive assistant for Deniz Baykal and had been nom-
inated and elected in 2007 as an MP from the RPP. She was known as a
powerful politician and the gatekeeper for the RPP presidency for the last
18 years.6 She is married to a businessman with a teenage daughter.
Nesrin Baytok’s reaction to this scandal can be best described as com-
plete silence. In the few interviews she volunteered after the scandal, similar
to Mr. Baykal, she did not nullify the video footage either. She told the
media that she was going through a difficult time, that her family was the
only support that she enjoyed at the moment, and that she had no future
plans for politics at the moment (“Nesrin Baytok İlk Kez Konuştu” [ Nesrin
Baytok Spoke For The First Time] 2010). She was able to come to the parlia-
ment building three weeks after the scandal, accompanied by her husband
(“Nesrin Baytok İlk Kez Mecliste” [Nesrin Baytok In the Parliament For the
First Time] 2010). The bottom line is that throughout the aftermath of the
scandal, she kept her silence about the video footage and the alleged inti-
mate encounter with Mr. Baykal. However, one should note that Ms. Baytok’s
silence should be evaluated under quite different terms than Mr. Baykal’s.
Ms. Baytok’s inability to confidently defend her position throughout the
negotiation of the scandal in the public may be attributed to the patriarchal
character of the public sphere, which does not tolerate the extramarital affairs
of women in the same way that it does for men. By contrast, Mr. Baykal’s
silence (i.e., his refraining from directly talking about the alleged affair) was a
tactical move displaying the agency of a powerful male actor to draw the line
between his public and private selves. He strictly refused to talk about the
alleged affair in the public realm. Ms. Baytok, conversely, could not defend
her right to privacy in the public realm the way that Mr. Baykal did.
Not only did Ms. Baytok herself choose to remain silent about the event
but the political actors who commented on the event in the media and the
media coverage of the story itself also reduced her to silence. Newspapers
from both ends of the political spectrum totally erased Ms. Baytok’s name
from coverage of the story.
Cumhuriyet newspaper, for example, a well-known supporter of the






























472 D. Cindoglu and D. Unal
reference to the identity of Ms. Baytok, but rather referring to her as ‘a
woman’: “Previous night in its website, Vakit newspaper published a video
broadcast of a man, who is claimed to be Deniz Baykal, together with a
woman” (“CHP’ye Kaset Şoku” [Videotape Shock in RPP] 2010).
Hurriyet newspaper, known for its liberal political stance, reported the
results of the investigation of the private detective by using a similar language
and erased the identity of Nesrin Baytok, suggesting: “The man in the video
is not Mr. Baykal and the woman is someone else” (“Görüntülerdeki Baykal
Değil” [The Man in the Videotape Is Not Baykal] 2010).
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also used a similar tone of erad-
ication by referring to Nesrin Baytok as ‘the other name’: “Up until now,
the main opposition leader has not said that he did not do such an act.
The other name, who is involved, has not made such a declaration either”
(“Başbakandan Eş Aldatma Açıklaması” [PM’s Speech about Being Unfaitful
to the Spouse] 2010).
However, Bülent Arınç, the deputy prime minister, overlooking Nesrin
Baytok’s identity, suggested that: “The lady who is alleged to be in the video
clip is a politician, too and a parliamentarian indeed. They are both married
. . . I personally expect from Mr. Baykal and from the lady who is alleged to be
there to state that there is no such thing” (“Böyle Bir Şey Yoktur Açıklaması
Beklerdim” [I Expected Baykal To Deny the Videotape] 2010).
These statements illustrate how the politicians who commented on the
scandal and the reporters who narrated the event refrained from using Ms.
Baytok’s name, even though her persona was very well known to all, prefer-
ring to use labels such as “a woman,” “the other name who is involved,” or
“the lady who is alleged to be there.” These attitudes of the opponent and
proponent media and the politicians can be interpreted as a denial of the
woman politician’s agency on the matters of sexuality.7
The almost unanimous consensus over refraining from openly mention-
ing Ms. Baytok’s name can also be attributed to the paternalistic attitudes
of the media and male politicians stemming from Turkish-Islamic modesty
and prudery, which aim to minimize damage to the woman’s honor in this
case. This paternalistic attitude may have something to do with the fact that
Ms. Baytok’s involvement in the scandal was considered highly embarrassing
and shocking to the public. Therefore, the attempts to refrain from mention-
ing her name in the coverage of the scandal could be regarded as damage
control on behalf of Ms. Baytok, the political climate, and the general public.
However, this attitude itself can be considered a sign of patriarchal control
over woman’s sexuality in Turkey, which disregards women’s agency in the
realm of sexuality.
It is true that the scandal resulted in severe consequences for Mr. Baykal.
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lost position in the RPP, which had never been contested in the previ-
ous 18 years. However, what is important here is that Mr. Baykal used all
possible means to defend his position and privacy, including giving press
conferences, interviews, and hiring a private detective agency.8 Moreover,
although he quit the leadership of the Republican People’s Party after the
release of the videotape, one year later, in the general elections held on
June 12, 2011, he ran for parliament and was reelected as a MP. What this
signifies is that despite the fact that his reputation had been seriously dam-
aged because of the scandal, there has not been any attempt to disqualify him
from politics altogether, and he could carry on being active in the political
arena.
Unlike Mr. Baykal, Ms. Baytok did not speak in front of the public after
the scandal. As mentioned, in the only public statement that she provided
to media she stated the following: “I am going through hard times; the only
support that I get is from my family” (Nesrin Baytok İlk Kez Konuştu” [Nesrin
Baytok Spoke for the First Time] 2010). Speculation about Ms. Baytok’s per-
sonal motivation to remain silent is difficult. However, in this article, by using
a feminist discursive analysis, we argue that Ms. Baytok’s silence cannot be
understood thoroughly without taking into account the fact that women’s
sexuality and autonomy are always cast as an oxymoron in the social and
political context of Turkey. Considering the overarching patriarchal control
on women’s sexuality in Turkey, it can easily be suggested that the vulner-
ability of Ms. Baytok’s position in the public sphere did not permit her to
stand confidently in the public and defend her reputation and her rights to
privacy.
Furthermore, one should note that the process of negotiation of the
scandal resulted in Ms. Baytok’s total disqualification from the field of poli-
tics. In the aftermath of the scandal, rumors had arisen that she lacked the
credentials and experience to be an MP. Although she is a graduate of Middle
East Technical University of Ankara, one of the most reputable universities
in Turkey, and had gained political experience by serving for the RPP over
18 years, Ms. Baytok was accused of using her relationship with Mr. Baykal
as an entrée into the parliament.9 In the end, she was not nominated as a
candidate in the last general elections in June 2011. Considering the author-
itarian party structures of Turkish politics (Ayan-Musil 2011), Ms. Baytok’s
case is not exceptional; most candidates are in fact nominated from the
party leaders’ lists, including but not limited to the RPP in contemporary
Turkey. Therefore, it flies in the face of common practice and is patently
unjust to disqualify Ms. Baytok from politics based on the mere fact that Mr.
Baykal had nominated her. Indeed, Ms. Baytok had been involved in the
political staff of the RPP for 18 years as an executive assistant and had































474 D. Cindoglu and D. Unal
WOMAN AND PATRIARCHAL POLITICS: BAYTOK’S MARITAL
STATUS AS A CRITICAL FEATURE IN THE SCANDAL
Political life is highly gendered and full of gendered inequalities working
against women (Lovenduski and Norris 1993). Unequal access to education
and occupation, the burden of domestic responsibilities, and discriminatory
rules of party politics obstruct women’s participation in politics. Even when
women succeed in entering the patriarchal arena of politics, quite often they
have to deal with another set of gendered inequalities that are deeply embed-
ded in the public imagination and in the routine workings of representational
politics and therefore impede women’s impact on policymaking. They may
face “negative stereotyping” or be reduced to being judged solely on appear-
ance (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Kahn 1996; Sreberny-Mohammadi and
Ross 1996). Moreover, they are associated with the so-called feminine traits,
emotionality and lack of leadership skills, and are therefore ghettoized to
so-called women’s issues, such as the family, education, and health care.
Unlike their male counterparts, women’s physical appearance and personal
lives, rather than their professional skills and competencies, are so often
fodder for public debates.
Throughout the negotiation of the Baykal/Baytok scandal the image
of woman as politician experienced the most adverse treatment; her per-
sona was subjected to total annihilation and obliteration from the public
debates. The unraveling of the social and political discourses resulting in
such a fatal consequence for a woman who had been active in politics for
nearly 20 years gives clues about the nature of contemporary patriarchal
politics in contemporary Turkey.
In Turkey, politics has always been an area that is reserved for men.
Since the enfranchisement of women in 1934, women’s representation in
the parliament has always been very limited, symbolic, and extraordinary,
and the highest echelons of politics have been closed to women’s access
(Tekeli 1981, 304). Women’s presence in the political field historically has
been mobilized by male support. Arat (1989) suggests that women MPs
were predominantly encouraged by their fathers and husbands to partici-
pate. However, as Arat (1989) notes, once inside the halls of politics women
politicians could no longer get male support and faced patriarchal power
structures in doing politics. While engaged in politics, women may adopt
male discourses with the aim of having their voices heard in conventional
politics or political parties endorsing conservative gender discourses; there-
fore, women politicians’ efforts to point out gender issues seems futile. Thus,
it is argued that women’s visibility in politics does not necessarily correspond
to increased representation of women’s needs and demands (Güneş-Ayata
and Tütüncü 2008). Rather, it is quite likely that women in politics, as seen
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down their public statements and adopt a much more modest stance with
regard to political discussions related to women’s issues (Güneş-Ayata and
Tütüncü 2008).
These findings beg the question: how does a woman politician sur-
vive in the patriarchal political field in Turkey? It is more likely for a woman
politician to gain an important place in the top decision-making bodies when
she does not explicitly favor women’s interests or display a commitment to
feminist ideology.10 Moreover, the “ideal woman politician” in the Turkish
context is expected to behave in a sexually modest manner—a more ampli-
fied version of the same modesty that is expected of women in public in
general in Turkey that can best be summarized as not drawing attention to
oneself in either one’s dress or behavior. To climb the ladders of politics,
she may feel obliged to display an ideal modest image to not cause any
sexual implication (Güneş-Ayata 1995, 247). This patriarchal control over the
woman politician not only restricts her actions in the political arena and lim-
its her way of engaging in politics but also attempts to regulate her mores
and manners in the realm of sexuality. The Baykal/Baytok scandal is very
critical in this sense because it vividly crystallized how a woman politician in
Turkey is exposed to patriarchal control over her behaviors regarding sex-
uality. This control is further reinforced by means of the emphasis on the
familial roles of the women politicians.11 The “contract” between the woman
politician and the patriarchal system stipulates that she cannot neglect her
duties at home. This means that the career of the woman politician has to
be built on her maintaining a traditional family life and therefore results in a
tension between family and work.12 Failing to be an ideal mother and wife
who is monogamous and faithful to her husband and family have resulted in
severe consequences for a woman politician. In the Baykal/Baytok scandal,
such a failure led to the termination of the woman politician’s career.
Ms. Baytok’s Marital Status as a Critical Feature in the Scandal
Scandals whose subjects are men crossing the boundaries of marital fidelity
have been tolerated in Turkish political history to some extent especially
when the woman in question is a single woman.13 As Göle (1997) argues,
Islamic contexts treat women’s modesty as a main discursive tool for con-
trolling public visibilities and intimacies and the control of the public sphere
heavily depends on the monitoring of women. Women’s sexuality is exposed
to constant surveillance under Islamic dictates and patriarchal values in
Turkey. It is something that is explicitly addressed in Islamic custom and
is justified because it aims to eliminate fitne, literally, chaos, and ensure pub-
lic order. As a result, women’s premarital and extramarital affairs may be
considered beyond imagination in these contexts (Cindoglu et al. 2008, 245).
Bearing this in mind, we suggest that it was not Mr. Baykal’s involvement in
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the Turkish public’s acceptance level and led to severe consequences for
both Mr. Baykal and Ms. Baytok.
In a similar way, in other Western political cultures, the situation is not
that different when it comes to the toleration of men’s extramarital affairs.
When the male politicians are involved in extramarital affairs, the other
women in the story are almost always single. The Clinton/Lewinsky affair
could be a relevant example here. In 1998 US President Bill Clinton was
accused of having sexual relations with the 22-year-old White House intern
Monica Lewinsky. As the scandal erupted, Clinton felt no need to tender his
resignation. In the aftermath of the scandal, the public surprisingly remained
consistent in its support for Clinton (Sonner and Wilcox 1999).
However, neither secular Western nor Islamic conservative discourses
regarding infidelity can conceive or tolerate an extramarital affair of a married
woman. The possible polygamy of women is beyond the imagination and
acceptance of public morality and is therefore punished severely (Cindoglu
et al. 2008). Not only are married women’s extramarital sexual relation-
ships inconceivable in contemporary Turkey but even premarital sexual
relationships of women are considered intolerable and exposed to harsh
social censure. Reconstructive virginity surgeries are a reminder of just how
pervasive and entrenched this norm is (Cindoglu 1997).
In that framework we can safely argue that the effects of the scandal for
Ms. Baytok have been more dramatic due to her gender. It can be argued that
what stretched the moral limits of the public was not necessarily the alleged
polygamy of Mr. Baykal but rather Ms. Baytok’s marital status. As a married
woman, the alleged affair exposed her as being involved in an extramarital
relationship and violated the dominant, patriarchal moral codes of sexuality
in contemporary Turkey.
Conservative sexual codes regarding women’s sexuality have been at
the very center of the foundation of modern Turkey. To gain entry into
the public sphere, formerly literally veiled Ottoman women could transition
into modern Turkish women if they were willing to “veil” their sexuality
in a male public domain. In this framework the new woman of the new
Republic was “a well-educated, professional and socially active woman in the
public sphere and a biologically functioning woman in the family fulfilling
responsibilities as a wife and mother” (Durakbaşa 1998). One could claim
that it is a similar patriarchal discourse that attempts to regulate Ms. Baytok’s
sexuality today and disqualifies her from the political arena. It is interesting to
see that political parties, no matter how they diverge from each other on the
political spectrum, can easily reach a consensus when it comes to patriarchal
control over women’s sexuality. Vis-à-vis the sex scandal in question, MPs
from both from the RPP and the JDP could agree on the obliteration of the
woman politician’s career when she “failed” to submit to patriarchal control
over her sexuality and justified the silencing of Ms. Baytok through their
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talking about the scandal nor did they react to her not being nominated as a
candidate in the June 2011 elections.14
As stated above, the early Republican period created a new nation by
regulating women’s sexuality and the private sphere. Similar to this founding
era, in the last three decades, during which Turkey witnessed economic and
political liberalism, an elaborate conservative and patriarchal discourse on
morality and family arose (Keçeli 2010). This has been a time when Turkey
has gone through an all-encompassing transformation toward liberalization
covering every aspect of life (i.e., economics, culture, politics, and art). In the
midst of such a comprehensive transformation, the regulation of morality has
made itself felt via various public discourses and regulations. In the realm
of sexuality, for example, virginity,15 procreative sexuality, and monogamy
for women have been strongly encouraged and homosexuality, premarital
sex for women, and obscenities have been strictly denounced. Institutional
interventions have been introduced for censorship. In 1994 RTÜK (Radio
Television Supreme Council) was established along with the opening of
many private TV channels and aimed to keep TV broadcasting under con-
trol in line with prevailing moral values. In addition to this new council, the
Obscenity Law [Küçükleri Muzır Neşriyattan Koruma Kanunu] was amended
to strictly censor obscene publications.
A further wave of strengthening of conservative moral values, patriarchal
discourse, and orthodox norms of sexuality has come to the forefront with
the JDP’s coming to power in 2002. The conservative politics of the party
places great emphasis on family and women’s familial responsibilities. The
family stands as the core value of conservative politics in the mindset of the
JDP, and the disintegration of the family is perceived as the most threaten-
ing aspect of the modern era (Çitak and Tür 2008). The JDP even initiated
a debate on the legal punishment of adultery in September 2004 with the
aim of protecting the institution of the family in Turkey. Accordingly, the
JDP leadership attempted to add a clause to the Turkish Penal Code that
would make adultery a crime.16 Eventually, harsh criticism coming from the
press, women’s organizations, and the European Union (EU) prevented the
JDP from adding the clause in question into the Penal Code.17 In addition to
JDP’s failed attempts to criminalize adultery, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s call for
couples to have at least three children could be regarded as another exam-
ple that clearly reveals the party’s conservative politics.18 This pronatalist
approach attempts to regulate men’s and women’s reproductive capacities,
regards a woman’s womb as a discursive site to be utilized for political pur-
poses, and defines the ideal woman citizen as someone who gives birth to at
least three children. In brief, by heavily stressing the sanctity of the family in
contemporary Turkey, defining familial responsibilities in a traditional way,
and hampering women’s autonomy in the realm of reproduction, the gender
politics of the JDP makes women’s public roles heavily dependent on their
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In this sense it is useful to read the Baykal/Baytok scandal and its
gendered character against this background of strengthening conservative
norms on sexuality and family in Turkey. This proliferating discourse may
have increased the severity of the consequences of the Baykal/Baytok scan-
dal for both actors, but it is certain that the actors were in no way treated
evenly in the process of narration and resolution of the event.
CONCLUSION
The public sphere, despite its rhetoric of equal access to all, rests on mul-
tiple exclusions including gender (Fraser 1990, 1992). In this exclusionary
sphere, from the point of gender, women’s sexuality and autonomy are cast
as an oxymoron. Even though women can participate in the public realm as
professionals and politicians in contemporary Turkey, they are still expected
to remain submissive when it comes to the issue of personal autonomy and
to veil their sexuality.
Historically, women’s sexuality has been a domain that has been highly
controlled through various traditional, social, and political mechanisms in
Turkey. The virginity examinations, reconstructive virginity surgeries, and
honor killings can all be considered as some of the examples of this control.
Patriarchal sexual moral codes cut across education and social status; both
rural and uneducated women as well as highly educated and professional
women even in high political ranks are silenced in the realm of sexuality. The
Baykal/Baytok scandal is very emblematic in this sense because it evidently
exposes how persistent and overarching the patriarchal norms and values are
on women’s sexuality in both discursive and praxis levels in contemporary
Turkey.
The patterns of selection, emphasis, and interpretation of data that char-
acterize the narration of the scandal in Ms. Baytok’s position in the scandal
can be subsumed under three categories: (1) Public opinion vilified Ms.
Baytok’s qualifications by arguing that she used her relationship with Mr.
Baykal to become an MP, whereas Mr. Baykal’s misused authority in this
process has never been questioned. (2) The scandal led to the view that
Ms. Baytok no longer qualifies for the political arena. Ms. Baytok could not
compete in the following general elections in 2011; the RPP leadership did
not include her on the candidates list, whereas Mr. Baykal was reelected
as an MP. (3) Except for a few timid feminist voices, public opinion totally
ignored the gender dimension involved in the narration and resolution of
the scandal.
It is certain that the scandal has led to severe consequences for both Mr.
Baykal and Ms. Baytok’s political careers and public credibility, albeit with
different levels of impact. Although he was not exempted from the sanctions
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fatal. As the news about the scandal became more widespread, Mr. Baykal
felt obliged to resign from the leadership of the RPP. However, throughout
the negotiation process of the scandal, he acted in a self-confident manner
and guarded his privacy by refraining from directly talking about the alleged
affair, while Ms. Baytok remained silent.
The maintenance of public credibility, defined as a symbolic realm
shaped by the actors in line with the moral and discursive boundaries of
the public, becomes extremely difficult when actors fail to abide by the pre-
vailing codes, values, and discourses of the community in which they live.
Yet it is important to note that the negotiation of the public credibility of
actors in the public debate is not exempt from the exclusionary character of
the public sphere based on gender. Furthermore, whenever women’s sexu-
ality is acknowledged, discussed, or debated in the public sphere either in
the context of an extramarital or premarital affair, this almost always works
against the public credibility of the woman in question. In the Baykal/Baytok
political sex scandal, the tools for restoring public credibility (i.e., giving
press conferences, interviews, and reentering the parliament) are not evenly
distributed among the actors. Fraser (1992) puts forward that the feminist
analysis of a sex scandal in the public debate draws our attention to the
gender-coded character of publicity and privacy. Through such an analysis, it
becomes evident that only the male has the power to draw the line between
the public and the private and to use the tools for restoring shattered public
credibility.
Throughout this sex scandal, one witnessed female passivity, and in
contrast observed the potent male actor with the power to speak and whose
words carry greater weight when it comes to sexuality, personal morality, and
autonomy. The reactions to this scandal, the narrations, and resolutions of it
inform us about enduring patriarchal conservative values regarding women’s
sexual autonomy in the public. When analyzing the scandal from a feminist
point of view, it is also important to take into account the marital status of
Ms. Baytok. We claim that it was not Mr. Baykal’s involvement in the scandal
but rather Ms. Baytok’s marital status that exceeded Turkish public’s level of
the acceptance and resulted in Mr. Baykal’s fall from the power. The infidelity
of a married man may be forgivable to an extent; however, his involvement
with a married woman surpasses all moral codes of conducts and therefore
exposed him to severe punishment by public censure in Turkey.
When the coverage and perception of the scandal is explored, it is
revealed that the patriarchal and conservative moral vision that led to Ms.
Baytok’s name being removed from all references to the affair and that pre-
vented her from speaking freely on her own behalf was prevalent in all
the discourses of the political actors and the media across different ide-
ological orientations. This consensus among the different political actors
across political parties may provide an inspiring starting point for further
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extremely pervasive, discourages women from employment in political staffs
and constitutes one of the greatest hurdles hindering women’s visibility and
effectiveness in the political arena. It can prevent women from engaging in
politics at all because the risks of “failure” to abide by the prevailing sexual
norms of society carry such a heavy punishment. Whether real or imag-
ined, evidence of sexuality that falls outside of the norms of conservative
patriarchal values in Turkey remains an ever-present threat to a woman’s
career in politics, not to mention her personal life. Where public trust is a
prerequisite to establishing one’s position, the Turkish public is far more will-
ing to forgive a male politician’s sexual transgressions, especially when the
“other” woman is anonymous and single and therefore possesses no social
persona or status.
To conclude, the Baykal/Baytok scandal demonstrates that it is very
hard for women in public positions to claim their privacy in the same way
that men in public positions can. When men transgress the moral codes of
the society, they might have been punished and demoted in their public roles
and their public credibility may be severely shattered, but they can still keep
the boundaries of the public and private lives. However, once women violate
the codes of the sexual regime, it is almost impossible for them to draw the
line between their public and private selves. We argue that this has a lot to
do with the history of the constitution of public life in Turkey. In the Turkish
context, women’s corporeal visibility and attempts to regulate and use it are
almost always at stake in the definition of the public sphere. Moreover, the
pervasive control over women’s sexuality constitutes a pivotal pillar of the
gendered discourse on the public sphere in Turkey. As the Baykal/Baytok
scandal revealed, for women to attain public roles and responsibilities in
governance, and keep these roles, they have to surrender to the values of
modesty. The display of sexually autonomous identities disqualifies women,
in the eyes of the public, from playing a role in politics.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Fatima Sakarya and the editor and the anonymous reviewers of
the Journal of Women, Politics and Policy for their valuable comments and
assistance with this article.
NOTES
1. The Prime Minister Mr. Erdoğan’s initial attempt to censor the broadcast of the videotape could
be seen as a form of solidarity among men to cover up an extramarital affair. Though later he shifted
toward more aggressive, judgmental, and moralist discourse against Mr. Baykal, he still did not even
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2. For an analysis about the challenges that the Clinton/Lewinsky scandal created for Bill Clinton’s
political leadership, see Owen (2000).
3. Can Dündar (2010) tells how RPP leader İsmet İnönü prevented the release of the love story
of the prime minister Adnan Menderes and the opera singer Ayhan Aydan to the press in the 1950s. See
Dündar (2010).
4. For discourses condemning a politician’s involvement in an extramarital affair, see Murat
Bardakçı 2010. For an approach investigating whether the videotape is a conspiracy, see Fatih Altaylı
2010. For those who stress the protection of individuals’ right to privacy, see Ertuğrul Özkök 2010 and
Ahmet Hakan 2010.
5. We are aware of the fact that the discourses regarding the relationship between gender and pub-
lic sphere in Turkey are not limited to the opposition between Kemalist-Secular and Islamist approaches.
Especially the last two decades witnessed the multiplication of the gender discourses including more rad-
ical approaches criticizing both the secular-Kemalist and Islamist perspectives. Nevertheless, the critical
feminist works do not make their way through mainstream political agendas as in the case of Cindoglu
(2011). This article is interested in the hegemonic discourses that shape gender identities in the public
sphere.
6. For an account of the powerful status of Ms. Baytok in the RPP, see “18 Yıldır Mutfaktaydı,
Şimdi Vitrine Çıktı” [She Was in the Kitchen for the last 18 Years, Now She is on the Stage]” 2007.
7. Because the public sphere is not an overarching space but rather encapsulates multiple com-
peting publics (Fraser 1990), not all the discourses of the public debate about the Baykal/Baytok scandal
were geared toward obliterating the persona of Ms. Baytok from the public realm. Some pointed out the
gender dimension in the treatment of Mr. Baytok and Ms. Baytok in the public debate and stressed that
women are always situated unevenly vis-a-vis men with respect to the matters of sexuality. The following
newspaper articles are examples of this approach: Çalışlar 2010 and Berkan 2010. Also, one of the few
names in the parliament who could see the gender dimension involved in the scandal was Güldal Akşit,
a woman politician from JDP, working for the Parliamentary Commission of Opportunity of Equality for
Women and Men. She declared that the real victim in the scandal is not the persona of Ms. Baytok or Mr.
Baykal but the women in politics in general (Milliyet, May 25, 2010). Moreover, Çiğdem Aydın, the chair-
woman of Ka-der, the Association for Supporting Women in Politics and Education said: “We are strongly
against the media’s treatment of the female deputy figure. Assuming a woman achieves such a high post
by using her sexuality is neither just nor ethical. This wrong perception could ‘kill’ any future attempt by
females to be involved in politics” (Dautaj-Şenerdem 2010).
8. As also mentioned at the beginning of the article, a similar case to the Baykal/Baytok scandal
emerged in Turkey just before the 2011 general elections. Some videotapes were released on the Internet,
showing male MPs from the Nationalist Action Party in intimate relations with two unidentified women.
Eventually, the pressure on these MPs became so strong that they had to resign. This case also shows that
the codes of the conservative sexual regime, which places the holiness of the family at the center, does
not exempt men either from submitting to the family ideal. However, even though these male politicians
are punished because of their “misconduct,” their subjectivities are not totally obliterated and silenced in
the public debate. The narrative of the scandal does not hide or shadow their names; they are treated as
the subjects of the alleged event. Moreover, they could take action against the violation of their privacy
by making a criminal complaint at the chief public persecutor’s office and urging the court to put a ban
on the broadcasting of the videotape.
9. See Sevilay Yükselir 2010.
10. The example of Tansu Çiller who served as the prime minister between 1993 and 1996 can
be remembered in this respect. Arat (1998) argues that though Çiller has indirectly contributed to the
women’s cause by representing a role model for other women, she has been detached from women’s
problems and did not approach women as a distinct constituency.
11. How the discourse on the familial roles of women politicians works in the Turkish context has
not been studied thoroughly so far and thus requires further attention.
12. Regarding this, by looking at gossip magazines in the Netherlands, van Zoonen (2000) points
out that while the families of male politicians are described as sacrificing, families of female politicians
are presented as suffering.
13. The aforementioned story about Adnan Menderes and Ayhan Aydan is one of the most well-
known examples.
14. Indeed, Mr. Erdoğan mentioned this issue during his elections campaign in Kastamonu. He
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not put her name on the candidate list. Why, is it because she was the only one who was guilty?
Weren’t they both guilty?” (“Erdoğan: Baykal aday, o hanım niye değil?” 2010). Although in this statement
Erdoğan seems to point out the gender inequality in the coverage of the Baykal/Baytok scandal, he
instrumentalizes the scandal and even the gender dimension here to appeal to the public and gain
electoral supremacy. He himself refrains from treating Ms. Baytok as a full subject and does not pronounce
her name.
15. In the 1990s there was a lot of media coverage of the stories about girls who have been
forced to virginity examination or who committed suicide to escape this state-enforced examination.
In 1997 Işılay Saygın, the then-minister in charge of women’s affairs, in one of her public talks, defended
virginity examinations as a vital means to guard the indigenous customs and traditions. For a detailed
account, see Parla (2001).
16. As a reaction to the draft law criminalizing adultery, on September 14, 2004, hundreds of
women marched to the Grand Assembly with the slogan, “our body and our sexuality is ours.” However,
the PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan denounced this protest by saying that placards of the protesting women
were not in line with the traditional values of the society and that these “marginal” women cannot
represent the ideal Turkish woman (Zaman, September 25, 2004).
17. For further analysis of the adultery debate in Turkey, see Müftüler-Baç and Onar (2011).
18. On March 8, 2008, attending a gathering on the occasion of Women’s Day, Erdoğan urged
women to have at least three children and warned that failing to preserve a young population would
endanger the future of the nation (“Turkish Prime Minister under Fire for Urging to Have More Children”
2008).
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Arat, Yeşim. 2005. Rethinking Islam and Liberal Democracy: Islamist Women in
Turkish Politics. New York, NY: SUNY Press.
Ayan-Musil, Pelin. 2011. Authoritarian Party Structures and Democratic Political
Setting in Turkey. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan.
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“Başbakandan Eş Aldatma Açıklaması” [PM’s Speech about Being Unfaithful to
the Spouse]. 2010. Hurriyet. http://webtv.hurriyet.com.tr/2/6444/0/1/basbakan-
dan-es-aldatma-aciklamasi.aspx (July 15, 2010).
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